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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.
consent

That
to

the

search

State unreasonably
Defendant's

vehicle

detained
was

a

Defendant
result

of

and
an

unconstitutional seizure.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The Constitution of the United States, Fourth Amendment,
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
The Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 14,
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
person or thing to be seized.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Defendant/Appellant contends that the search and seizure of
Defendant/Appellant's vehicle was an unconstitutional violation of
Appellant's constitutional rights as guaranteed by Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and in Article I, Section 14, of
the Constitution of the State of Utah, in that the officers had no
reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Defendant/Appellant and
search his vehicle.

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.
by

the

This is an appeal taken from the plea of guilty entered
Defendant/Appellant

on

or

about

May

25,

1989,

and

resentencing on November 8, 1989.
2.

The Defendant was arrested on the charge of Possession of

a Controlled Substance on or about February 27, 1989. (Record,
page 1)
3.

The

Appellant's

car

was

searched

on

said

date.

(Transcript, page 24, lines 8 through 17; Transcript, page 29, line
12 through page 30, line 7)
4.

That Marijuana was found in the vehicle.

(Transcript,

page 35, lines 1 through 5)
5.

That Defendant offered and asked to drive the car, leave

the scene. (Transcript, page 29, lines 1 through 8)
6.

That the officers had not reason to hold the car when

Appellant offered to drive away.

(Transcript, page 75, lines 1

through 25, and page 76, lines 1 through 3)

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN
THAT THE OFFICER HAD NO REASON TO DETAIN DEFENDANT AFTER
ARRESTING CO-DEFENDANT SHELLY HALL AND HAD NO REASON TO
BELIEVE THAT THE CAR WAS IMPROPERLY REGISTERED WHEN
APPELLANT ASKED TO BE ALLOWED TO LEAVE THE AREA AND
SUBSEQUENT CONSENT WAS RESULT OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DETENTION AND SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED.
At the Suppression Hearing the Appellant argued that the stop
was a pretext stop and the Court did not rule on whether or not the
2

stop was in fact a pretext or not and found that was not an issue
that needed to be determined.

(Transcript, page 169, lines 21

through 24) And for the purpose of this appeal the issue whether
the stop was a pretext stop or not is also basically unimportant.
In the case of United States vs. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th
Cir. 1988) the Court stated as follows:
"When the driver has produced a valid license and proof
that he in entitled to operate the car, he must be
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to
further delay by police for additional questioning. in
order to justify 'a temporary detention for questioning,'
the officer must also have reasonable suspicion of
illegal transactions and drugs or any other serious
crime."
The officer in this case stopped the Defendants because, in
his opinion, they seemed quite nervous and kept looking back.
(Transcript, page 8, lines 12 through 14)

After they stopped the

car they issued a citation for a cracked windshield and no driver's
license

in

possession

of

the

other

occupant,

Shelly

Hall.

(Transcript, page 31, lines 24 and 25; page 32, lines 1 through 9)
At that point the Defendant/Appellant did show that he had a valid
driver's license. (Transcript, page 32, lines 1 and 2) The driver
of the car, Shelly Hall, was attested in an NCI Warrant from Oregon
for dangerous drug violations.

(Transcript, page 32, lines 24 and

25) The officer had no concrete evidence or reasonable suspicion
that the Appellant had anything to hide.

(Transcript, page 26,

lines 6 through 12)
After Defendant showed proof that his driver's license was
valid, he offered to trade places and drive the car and was not

3

allowed to. Even prior to the arrest of Shelly Hall.

(Transcript,

page 29, lines 1 through 11; page 75, 17 though 25)
In the case of Unites States vs. Ralph Joseph Walker, (Dist.
Crt. of Ut., March 27, 1990) (A copy of the Memorandum Decision is
attached in the Appendix of this case), the United States District
Court on the District of Utah held as follows:
"State officers must comply with fundamental rules.
They must act constitutionally.
When they do not,
evidence gathered in derogation of fundamental rules
cannot be used. This is done not to insulate a defendant
from prosecution but to vindicate — take seriously —
the applicable constitutional provision. No one has yet
come up with a better way to ensure compliance with the
Constitution by state officers as they attempt to carry
out their duties.
"At times the lines drawn by Court of Appeals are very
narrow lines. Nevertheless, the lines as drawn by the
Court of Appeals are binding on officers who gather
evidence, prosecutors who screen and prosecute offenses,
and trial courts who hear cases. In applying the lines
that were drawn in Guzman, This court notes that "there
is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to
protect the privacy of us all." Arizona v. Hicks, 480
U.S. 31, 329 (1987).
Officer Graham had legal
justification to stop defendant for a traffic violation.
After inspecting defendant's driver's license and vehicle
registration, the officer did not have facts sufficient
for an objective, reasonable suspicion to justify
continued detention and more extensive questioning. From
that point on evidence obtained was tainted and must be
suppressed. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512.

4

POINT II.
THAT THE CONSENT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE WAS INVALID AS NOT
BEING VOLUNTARY.
The case of Schneckloth vs. Bustamanter 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
held that to show voluntariness of consent the state must show as
follows:
"(1) There was a clear and positive testimony that the
consent was unequivocal and specific and fairly and
intelligently given; (2) the government must prove that
consent was given without duress or court orders,
expressed or implied; (3) and the court must indulge in
every reasonable presumption against waiver of a
fundamental right and there must be convincing evidence
of such rights were waived."
In determining whether consent was voluntary or not the court
must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
case. Among circumstances that the court should determine are the
following:

Whether

the

Defendant

was

in

custody

or

not;

Defendant's upbringing and experience; Defendant's prior experience
with law enforcement; Remoteness of the area where the seizure took
place; The temporal proximity of the arrest and relinquishment of
the constitutional rights; The presence of any intervening events;
The purpose in the flagrancy of the State's misconduct; Whether
there was any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the State;
Whether or not the Defendant was aware of his right not to consent
to the search; and The acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority
is not sufficient to waive a fundamental right.
In this case it is clear in looking at the totality of the
circumstances that the Appellant had requested to leave the area
and had been told he could not leave even though he was not charged
5

with anything and he had a lawful driver's license and the car
appeared to be properly registered.

Further, there is absolutely

no evidence whether or not he was aware of his right not to consent
to the search when he did make the consent and that there is
evidence that he was having a diabetic crisis.

(Transcript, page

53, lines 7 through 9)

CONCLUSION
That

the

search

of

the

Appellant's

vehicle

was

unconstitutional in that any seizure or detention after he produced
a valid driver's license and registration for the vehicle was
unconstitutional and that his consent was freely and voluntarily
given.
DATED this Z_

day of April, 1990.

«TIN V.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, via First-class U.S. Mail,
postage prepaid this

//

day of April, 1990, to:

R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 843A
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

;

Plaintiff,
vs.
RALPH JOSEPH WALKER,

[i

MEMORANDUM OPINION £

]i

AND ORDERr;] >;••

i

Case No. 9Q-CR-13-.;

• V1

'.">
TJ

Defendant.

I

i

The Constitution of the United States is for everyman.
protects bad men as well as good*

It

It guarantees -the rights of

individuals "to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.• .,M
Const* amend. IV,

U.S.

The Fourth Amendment is binding on the states.

Wolf v, Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).

Its provisions inhibit

overreaching by public officers, well motivated or not.

Relying

upon this guarantee and the rules of law which give it meaning,
defendant in this case brought a motion to suppress evidence
allegedly

obtained

Amendments.

in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth

The motion was heard and evidence was taken in the

matter on March 15-16, 1990.
Esparza.

The

government

Defendant was represented by James

was

Assistant United States Attorney,

represented

by

Heather Cooke,

FACTS
Defendant Ralph Joseph Walker is a black man who# on January
10, 1990, was traveling west on Interstate 70 in Emery County,
Utah.

He was driving a blue 1988 Cadillac Fleetwood Brougham.

Officer Richard Graham of the Emery County Sheriff's Department was
traveling east on the interstate and noticed defendant's vehicle
approaching. The traffic was light*

Officer Graham observed that

the vehicle was traveling at a faster than posted speed. He aimed
his radar gun at defendant's vehicle and clocked defendant at 67
miles per hour —

12 miles per hour over the posted speed limit.

Officer Graham made a U-turn and pulled defendant over*
V7hile coming to a stop behind defendant's vehicle, Officer
Graham checked the license plate number on the Cadillac and was
informed that the vehicle had not been reported stolen.

Officer

Graham approached the vehicle and stated that he had clocked
iefendant speeding*

Transcript, Motion to Suppress, March 15-16,

990 at 48 [hereinafter Transcript]*

He asked defendant for his

river's license and vehicle registration and asked where defendant
as coming

from and his destination*

Transcript

at 9, 48*

sfendant stated that he was coming from Kansas City and was on his
*y home*

Transcript at 11. Defendant then requested permission

> get out of the car in order to obtain his license from the back
>cket of his slacks. Transcript at 48. As defendant stepped out
the car, he gave Officer Graham the vehicle registration.
fendant was nervous. His hands shook.

It was difficult for him

retrieve his license from the small compartment in his wallet*
2

He retrieved the license and gave it to Officer Graham. Transcript
at 9.
The license revealed to Officer Graham that it belonged to
defendant, identified him, and established his right to operate a
motor vehicle.

The Cadillac was registered in the name of Marian

Smith. Officer Graham questioned defendant about the registration*
Defendant stated that Marian Smith was his sister and that he was
driving the car with her permission.

Transcript at 11*

It was

later established that defendant had subleased the vehicle from Ms,
Smith.

A copy of the sublease agreement was in the vehicle

glovebox at the time defendant was stopped.
While retaining defendant's license and registration, Officer
Graham asked defendant a number of specific questions unrelated to
the traffic stop.

He asked if there were any weapons in the

vehicle, if there were any open containers of alcohol in the
vehicle, and if there was any controlled substance or paraphernalia
of any kind in the vehicle.

Officer Graham then asked if the

defendant was carrying any large quantities of cash.

Transcript

at 12* Defendant answered "no" to each question except for stating
that he had about $1600.00 cash in the glove box and about $150.00
cash in his pocket.

Transcript at 49. When Officer Graham first

approached the vehicle, he saw nothing to indicate that defendant
was carrying any of the

items about which he put questions.

Transcript at 21.
While still holding defendants license and registration, and
without informing defendant that he was free to go, further
3

discussing the speeding violation, or writing a citation, Officer
Graham asked defendant if he could search the vehicle for the items
about which he had inquired.
ahead."

Transcript at 12-13.

Defendant responded, "sure, go
Defendant was then asked to stand

by the right front fender of the vehicle.

He complied.

Officer

Graham patted defendant down, checked under his sweater, the top
of his slacks, and down his legs.
compartment

of the vehicle.

He then searched the passenger

In conformity

with defendant's

statement, Officer Graham found two rolls of cash in the glovebox
which were held together with rubber bands. He found nothing else
in the glovebox or in the passenger compartment.
then asked for and received the key to the trunk.
15.

Officer Graham
Transcript at

Upon opening the trunk, Officer Graham noticed two tan

packages wrapped in clear plastic tape located near the back seat.
The packages appeared to be kilogram packages of cocaine, officer
Graham informed defendant that he was under arrest and that he
should get on his hands and knees and then lie face down on the
ground.

Transcript at 15-16.

The defendant and vehicle were taken to Castle Dale, Utah.
A search warrant for the vehicle was obtained.

Further search of

the trunk uncovered 86 kilogram packages of cocaine.

Three small

plastic bags of cocaine were found in defendant's travel bag.

DISCUSSION
There is often misunderstanding as to the nature and purpose
of a motion to suppress footed on an alleged
4

constitutional

violation*
When

The simple purpose is vindication of fundamental law.

a dAfpnrJ^nt-

-f-i !<=»<= * -mr**-; *•*,-• 4-~ **««?*£.«•.«»,

^~- * * . ^ ~ * r

JLC ±~

~^

if he had filed a class action for and on behalf of all citizens
similarly detained. He speaks not just for himself. He speaks for
everyman to the end that government achieve constitutional ends by
constitutional means. That, simply put, is the glory of a written
constitution

and

the

touchstone

of

a

nation

which

provides

evenhanded law and order for everyman, good or bad.
The narrow but exquisitely important question presented by
this case is when may a person stopped for a traffic violation and
nothing more be

further detained

and

subjected

to questions

unrelated to the traffic stop.
It is well established that "the stopping of a vehicle and the
detention of its occupants constitutes a
meaning of the Fourth Amendment¥M

'seizure1 within the

Colorado v. Bannisterf 4 49 U.S.

1, 4 n.3 (1980); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
(1979)*

648, 653

In order to justify a defendant's continued detention, an

officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the stopped vehicle
is carrying contraband or that a detained defendant has committed
a crime. See

United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th

Cir» 1988) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S, 491, 498-99 (1983)).
Defendant attacks the seizure and search of his vehicle on
several grounds*

He first contends that the initial stop of his

vehicle was pretextual*

Defendants argument focuses on the fact

that he is black and was driving a Cadillac on a common drug
trafficking route. He contends that these were the reasons he was
5

stopped, not because he was

speeding.

In the alternative,

defendant contends that even

if the stop was justified, the

officer*s detention for further questioning was not justified by
the traffic stop.

Finally, defendant argues that he did not

voluntarily consent to having his vehicle searched. The government
contends that the initial stop was not pretextual and that the
questioning and search that followed were supported by the required
reasonable suspicion*
the

vehicle

was

The government further contends that, since

leased

by

Marian

Smith,

defendant

has

no

expectation of privacy and thus no standina to complain.
upon review ot tne evidence, this court finds that, as a
sublessee in possession, defendant had a "legitimate expectation
of privacy" in the vehicle, and thus has standing to challenge the
search.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U*S. 128, 143 (1978)*

explained how he had come to possess the vehicle.

Defendant
It was not

•vtolen. There is no evidence that he did not lawfully possess the
•ar. S€Le United States v. Miller, 821 F.2d 546, 548-49 (11th Cir.
987); United States v. Martinez, 808 F.2d 1050, 1056 (5th cir.
987) , cert.,, denied, 481 U.S. 1032 (1987).
The initial stop was not pretextual.

"A pretextual stop

:curs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop
t order to search a person or place, or to interrogate a person,
r an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the
asonable suspicion necessary to support a stop,"

Guzman, 864

2d at 1515; see also United States v. Fabela-Garcia, No. 88-CR(D. Utah 1988) (granting motion to suppress).
6

In determining

whether an officer had legal justification to stop a vehicle, an
objective standard is used.

Guzman, 864 F*2d at 1517. The court

should ask itself whether, under the same circumstances and with
the absence of any invalid purpose, a reasonable officer would havi*

made the stop.

Id,

A reasonable officer would have stopped defendant under these
circumstances * Defendant was traveling twelve miles per hour over
the posted speed limit.

Police officers routinely stop cars that

are traveling at such speeds and issue warnings or citations. This
stop was objectively justified, and there is no evidence to suggest
that the stop was pretextual.
Having determined that the initial stop was constitutional,
the court must next consider the detention and search that followed
and determine "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified the interference in the first place*"
Terry, v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968); see also Florida.v, Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion) ("The scope of the
detention

must

be

carefully

tailored

to

its

underlying

justification*n) .
The Tenth Circuit's Guzman

opinion is instructive, indeed

controlling, regarding a continued detention and search when a
person is stopped for a traffic violation-

The facts in this case

and the facts of Guzman are very similar.

Guzman points out that

,r

[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a

driver's license and vehicle registration, run a computer check,
and issue a citation,"

Guzman 864 F.2d at 1519 (citing United
7

States v, Gonzales, 763 F.2d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448r 1455 (10th Cir. 1985)),

The

Guzman court stated:
When the driver has produced a valid license, and proof
that he is entitled to operate the car, he must be
allowed to proceed on his way, vithout being,subjected
to further delay by police for additional questioning.
In order to justify fa temporary detention for
questioning,' the officer must also have reasonable
suspicion 'of illegal transactions in drugs or of any
other serious crime1.
Id, (emphasis added)(citations omitted).1
The narrow issue here is whether, prior to asking questions
unrelated to the traffic stop, the officer had a "reasonable
suspicion of illegal transactions in drugs or of any other serious
crime*1 which justified further detention of defendant, id.

Upon

reaching the driver's door, the officer asked for and received
defendants driver's license and the car registration* The license
was valid and belonged to defendant.

The vehicle registration

identified Marian Smith as the registered owner.

The officer

questioned defendant, who responded that Ms, Smith was his sister
md

that he was

driving the car with her permission.

utomobile was not stolen.

The

Defendant appeared nervous. His hands

hook when he removed the license from his wallet.

At that point

In Guzman, the officer asked defendant "whether his wife
is employed, where he was headed, where he worked, when he got
trried, and if they were carrying any large sums of money,"
i£man at 1514. The officer further inquired as to whether "they
re carrying weapons or contraband,"
1£,
The Tenth Circuit
cognized the fact that the district court deemed these intrusive
estions that the ordinary citizen would find offensive, id, at
19.
8
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the officer asked defendant if he had any weapons, alcohol, or any
type of controlled substance or paraphernalia of any kind in the
vehicle.

The officer further asked if defendant had any large

quantities of cash in the vehicle.2

Defendant answered "no" to

each of these questions, except for stating that he had $1600,00
in the glovebox and $150*00 in his pocket.

Finally, the officer

asked if he could search the vehicle for the items about which he
had asked.
At

the

suppression

hearing,

the

government

relied

on

defendant's nervousness and the registration in a name other than
his own as the basis for continued detention and questioning.
Defendant relied on Guzman to establish that continued detention

The United States Supreme Court has "yet to rule directly
on whether mere questioning of an individual by a police official,
without more, can amount to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment
" INS v. Deloado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984)* The Court stated
that:
[P]olice questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result
in a Fourth Amendment violation* While most citizens
will respond to a police request, the fact that people
do so, and do so without being told they are free not to
respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the
response. Unless the circumstances of the encounter are
so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable
person would have believed he was not free to leave if
he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning
resulted in a detention under the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
In this case, the officer did more that just question
defendant. The officer had pulled defendant over to the side of
the road and had possession of his driver's licence and vehicle
registration. Because the officer had his papers, defendant was
not free to leave. Defendant testified that he felt he was going
to be arrested at any moment. Transcript at 55, As in Guzman, the
stop was a seizure which evoked Fourth Amendment protection
requiring reasonable suspicion to justify defendant's continued
detention and questioning.
9

was not "objectively reasonable."

In Guzman, when an officer

approached one of the defendants, she would not look the officer
in the eye, was apprehensive, and was notably perspiring. Guzman
864 F.2d at 1520.

The court also noted that she was noticeably

pregnant and was sitting in a car with the engine off in the middle
of the desert several thousand miles from her home.

Ici.

Under

those circumstances, the court found that her actions did not
arouse objective suspicion.3
nervousness
justifying

Id.

As in Guzman, defendants

in this case did not create objective
the

officer's

continued

detention

and

suspicion
intrusive

questions.
Guzman stated that "when the driver produces ... proof that
he is entitled to operate the car, he must be allowed to proceed
on his way

* . . ."

Id* at 1519

(emphasis added).

Defendant

furnished the registration and stated that he had permission to
operate the car.

The officer asked for nothing more.

Defendant

later testified that the glovebox contained a signed copy of a
sublease agreement between Ms. Smith and defendant.

Had the

officer asked for proof of entitlement to operate the Cadillac,
defendant claims that he would have produced it.

This, coupled

with the facts that the officer had no evidence to establish that
the car was stolen or that defendant was not entitled to operate

In United States v. Grille. 705 F. Supp* 576 (M-D. Ga.
1989), the court found that nervousness, combined with the facts
that the officer knew that the defendant had a loaded gun and that
while stopped defendant had reached under his seat and either
retrieved or placed something, established reasonable suspicion
which justified additional questioning.
10

it, leaves the record bereft of evidence, at that point, to
establish reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed a crime
or was carrying contraband.

The question of sequence is of

monumental importance•
The government's final argument is that defendant was detained
for only ten minutes before he was arrested•

The United States

Supreme Court made clear in United States v, Sharpe, 470 U*S* 675,
685-87 (1985), that the basis for and circumstances surrounding the
stop, rather than an arbitrary time limit, determine the stop's
permissible length. Here, the stop was for a short period of time.
Nevertheless, the detention was unreasonable because it extended
beyond the scope justified by the original traffic stop*
officer

continued

the

detention

without

additional

facts

establish reasonable suspicion of a more serious crime*

The
to
The

detention and subsequent search thus violated the Fourth Amendment.
See Gu2man, 864 F.2d at 1519 n,8.
Defendant's final argument is that he did not voluntarily
consent to the search.

Having found that defendants Fourth

Amendment rights were violated at the time the officer detained him
and put additional questions, the court need not address the issue
of consent.

CONCLUSION
State officers must comply with fundamental rules. They must
act constitutionally*

When they do not, evidence gathered in

derogation of fundamental rules cannot be used.
11

This is done not

to insulate a defendant from prosecution but to vindicate —
seriously —

the applicable constitutional provision.

take

No one has

yet come up with a better way to ensure compliance with the
Constitution by state officers as they attempt to carry out their
duties*
At times the lines drawn by Court of Appeals are very narrow
lines.

Nevertheless, the lines as drawn by the Court of Appeals

are binding on officers who gather evidence, prosecutors who screen
and prosecute offenses, and trial courts who hear cases.

In

applying the lines that were drawn in Guzman, this court notes that
M

[t]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution

sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect
the privacy of us all,11
(1987).

Arizona v. Hicksf 480 U.S. 321, 329

Officer Graham had legal justification to stop defendant

for a traffic violation.

After inspecting defendants driver's

license and vehicle registration, the officer did not have facts
sufficient for an objective, reasonable

suspicion

to justify

continued detention and more extensive questioning.

From that

point on evidence obtained was tainted and must be suppressed.
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this

$7

day of March, 1990.

